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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explore the potential reasons for the antagonistic sentiments that are held by 
many Protestant evangelicals, in the United States, towards the European Union.  The possible 
causal factors include the following: 
1) The legacy of anti-internationalism among evangelicals, dating back to the debate over 
American membership in the League of Nations almost 100 years ago; 
2) The level of attraction to the current wave of “populist” politics and economics; 
3) The aversion of politically conservative American evangelicals to the perception of 
Europe as a “socialist’ continent; 
4) The negative portrayal of the European Union, as an instrument of “globalism,” in widely 
held manifestations of American evangelical theology. 
A major dimension of this paper will be an examination of the points of tangency between 
the preceding elements, including a consideration of the extent to which they reinforce and 
support one another.  Does the skepticism with which American evangelicals view the European 
Union – and other multinational institutions – primarily stem from the application of certain 
theological positions that are reinforced by their political perspectives, or is it the other way 
around?  Is evangelical antipathy towards the EU a manifestation of the recent observation by 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister of Norway and Director-General of the World 
Health Organization, that Americans who maintain that “Washington is the problem,” and 
Europeans who assert that “Brussels is the problem,” are essentially making the same argument?  
How accurate is the economic narrative that emerges from this interaction of politics and 
theology? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his book, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century:  The Great Transition, the Quaker  
 
economist Kenneth Boulding maintained that a worldview consists of three parts:  a persuasive 
 
interpretation of history, a moral system which produces subsequent actions, and a particular  
 
outlook for the future.1 All of these dimensions are relevant to an understanding of the reasons  
 
for the antagonistic sentiments which are held by many conservative Protestant evangelicals, in  
 
the United States, towards the European Union.2  The historical roots of this perspective can be  
 
found in the opposition of conservative Protestants to American membership in the League of  
 
Nations one hundred years ago.3  Markku Ruotsila has concluded that the skepticism towards  
 
international institutions that emanated from this event “was a clearly argued and widely  
 
believed-in set of attitudes that objected to multilateral cooperation in international organizations  
 
that were multiethnic, secular, and political; that contained members from many different  
 
religious traditions; and that pretended to worldwide supranational authority.”4  This final  
 
element has been an integral part of the anti-internationalist narrative from the time of the 
 
League of Nations debate until the present day.  A prime example can be found in the  
 
widespread evangelical interpretation of the story of the Tower of Babel, which can be found in  
 
Chapter Eleven of the Book of Genesis.  Jacob Viner, who is regarded as one of the early  
 
founders of what has become known as the “Chicago School” of economics,5 cited this passage,  
                                                          
1 Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century:  The Great Transition  (New York:  Harper and 
Row, 1965), 162-163. 
2 The historian George Marsden has asserted that “the essential evangelical beliefs include (1) the Reformation 
doctrine of the final authority of the Bible, (2) the real historical character of God’s saving work recorded in 
Scripture, (3) salvation to eternal life based on the redemptive work of Christ, (4) the importance of evangelism and 
missions, and (5) the importance of a spiritually transformed life.”  Understanding Fundamentalism and 
Evangelicalism  (Grand Rapids:  William B. Eerdmans, 1991), 4-5.  The use of the adjective,” conservative,” 
primarily refers to the political and cultural inclinations of a significant proportion of the evangelical community in 
the United States. 
3 It should be noted that persons with evangelical beliefs, as defined by George Marsden, were present, in significant 
numbers, in a wider range of Protestant denominations than would be the case today.   
4 Markku Ruotsila, The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism:  Conservative Evangelicals and the League of 
Nations  (Washington:  Georgetown University Press, 2008), 188. 
5 Although the “Chicago School” phrase did not become commonly used until after Jacob Viner left the University 
of Chicago for Princeton University in 1946, he is identified by Johan Van Overtveldt as a “prime example” of a 
in the 1960’s, as an example of “a text which has been an obstacle to acceptance on religious  
 
grounds of a universalistic or cosmopolitan approach to international relations.”6  A  
 
contemporary example of this reluctance can be found in the writings and commentaries of  
 
David Jeremiah, the senior pastor of Shadow Mountain Community Church, an evangelical  
 
“megachurch” in the suburbs of San Diego, California, who is also the featured speaker on the  
 
Turning Point syndicated radio and television programs.  His interpretation of this passage is that  
 
“mankind, settling in smaller communities throughout the world, would not be tempted toward  
 
the self-importance and sense of power that massive centralization would foster.”7  It should be  
 
noted that these sentiments have not been shared, historically, by other branches of Protestant  
 
Christianity in the United States.  Michael Thompson has written that one of the defining  
 
features of what he has described as “Christian internationalism,” in the time period between the  
 
two World Wars,  “was its distinct structure of thinking (emphasis in the original) that held  
 
Christian universalism to be a check against nationalism rather than a boon for it.”8 By contrast,  
 
Thompson maintains that conservative evangelicals were largely disengaged from these  
 
initiatives, in part because of their disagreements with those Protestants whose theological  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“Chicago” economist.  The Chicago School:  How the University of Chicago Assembled the Thinkers Who 
Revolutionized Economics and Business (Chicago:  B2 Books, 2007), 2, 4. 
6 Jacob Viner, The Role of Providence in the Social Order:  An Essay in Intellectual History (Philadelphia:  
American Philosophical Society, 1972), 48.  As an aside, it has been quite common, in the years following the 
Second World War, for American evangelical pastors, who hold an anti-internationalist perspective, to 
metaphorically refer to the United Nations headquarters in New York as a modern-day “Tower of Babel.”  For an 
example, see Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt:  Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of 
Evangelical Conservatism (New York:  W. W. Norton, 2011), 161.  A very recent application of the “Tower of 
Babel” metaphor, to this year’s World Economic Forum, in this case, can be found in Jon Miltimore’s Acton 
Institute commentary, “What if Davos Man got baptized?”  
https://acton.org/publications/transatlantic/2018/01/26/what-if-davos-man-got-baptized  Accessed 29 January 2018. 
7 David Jeremiah, The Coming Economic Armageddon:  What Bible Prophecy Warns about the New Global 
Economy (New York:  Faith Words, 2010), 34-35. 
8 Michael G. Thompson, For God and Globe:  Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great 
War and the Cold War (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2015), 4.  Scott Thomas has added that Protestant 
internationalists, during this time period, “not only backed the Marshall Plan but also engaged in the construction of 
the Bretton Woods system” (which included the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank).  “The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Changing Character of International Politics” (pp. 110-138), in 
Max L. Stackhouse with Diane B. Obenchain (eds.), God and Globalization, vol 3:  Christ and the Dominions of 
Civilization (Harrisburg, PA:  Trinity Press International, 2002), 125-126. 
perspectives were too “liberal” and “modern” for their way of thinking.9 
 
 During this time, evangelical theology in the United States also incorporated, to an  
 
increasing degree, the last dimension of Boulding’s conception of a worldview:  a particular  
 
outlook for the future.  Thompson describes this outlook as “a belief that contemporary history as  
 
interpreted through biblical prophecy revealed the activity of the anti-Christ and the end of the  
 
world.”10  One of the manifestations of this perspective, in combination with the historical  
 
background that has been discussed previously, is a skepticism, if not outright hostility, to global  
 
organizations to which the United States not only belongs, but was also instrumental in their  
 
establishment, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World  
 
Bank.11  As the “European project” of economic and (to some extent) political integration has  
 
both widened and deepened over the last seventy years, this outlook has been extended to what  
 
has become the European Union, even though the United States is not, and never will be, a  
 
member of this body.  An example of the theological roots associated with this disposition can be  
 
found in David Jeremiah’s application of certain passages in the Old Testament book of Daniel.   
 
Jeremiah’s interpretation leads to the conclusion that the European Union not only represents a  
 
                                                          
9 Ibid., pp. 5-6.  As a part of the same discussion, Thompson also argues that the views of American Protestant 
internationalists of the inter-war period resisted a simple characterization, representing instead “a conciliatory and 
astute blend of neo-orthodoxy and traditional evangelicalism.”  On the original point, Markku Ruotsila has 
concurred in the judgment that Christian anti-internationalism, at the time of the League of Nations debate in the 
United States, “was an aspect of the wider fight against modernist theology and the Social Gospel,” which 
evangelicals associated with a de-emphasis on the need for personal conversion.  Ruotsila, op. cit.  Mark Amstutz 
has added that while evangelicals “have been strongly committed to the idea of the world as a coherent moral 
community, they have nonetheless been skeptical of the role of international governmental organizations,” in part 
due to the judgment that these institutions embodied a belief “that world peace could be achieved without a 
fundamental spiritual transformation.”  Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 66. 
10 Thompson, p. 6.   
11 David Jeremiah provides a negative characterization of the mission and work of the United Nations, including the 
statement (p. 38) that “many of these works (of art in the United Nations headquarters building) contain biblical 
allusions, though Bible passages are often misquoted and certainly misapplied by their use in support of globalism.”  
The Coming Economic Armageddon, pp. 37-40.  By contrast, Jeremiah treats the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank in a more benign manner, while indicating that their current existence could pave the way for a “real 
global bank” with “real control of the world’s economy.”  Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
revival of the ancient Roman Empire, but will also provide the institutional platform for the  
 
eventual rise to power of the person of the anti-Christ, who is referenced in the New Testament  
 
book of Revelation.12  The irony of this situation is that a number of the early proponents of  
 
European integration were motivated by their Christian (albeit not evangelical) convictions, and  
 
that the European political parties in the Christian Democratic tradition have been historically  
 
supportive of the European project.  Frans Alting von Geusau has supported the former argument  
 
by stating that “these men changed the course of European and Western history, acting from the  
 
depth of their faith as Christians.”13  With respect to the latter position, Wolfram Kaiser has  
 
contended that the Christian Democratic movement across Europe, as represented by the  
 
contemporary European People’s Party (EPP), “dominated the formation of the ECSC/EEC core  
 
Europe with fundamental long-term repercussions for the present-day EU.”14  The lack of  
 
awareness of this historical legacy could very well explain why the association of European  
 
integration with Catholicism has never found much traction among American evangelicals.  In  
                                                          
12 David Jeremiah, What in the World Is Going On?  10 Prophetic Clues You Cannot Afford to Ignore (Nashville:  
Thomas Nelson, 2008), 56-65.  Jeremiah’s specific statement, on page 65, is that “the new European Union is one of 
the conditional preludes to the coming of the Antichrist.”  Page 61 of this volume also contains a map in which the 
assumed boundaries of the old Roman Empire are imposed upon the current Member States of the European Union.  
Brent Nelsen and James Guth have maintained that similar sentiments are present among European evangelicals, but 
they conclude that once an observer has taken “denominational and party membership into account, we can safely 
assume that the number of end-times Christians is fewer than five percent in each of the Protestant European 
countries.”  “European Union or Kingdom of the Antichrist?  Protestant apocalyptic narratives and European unity.” 
National Identities, vol. 19, no. 2 (2017), 253.  Nelsen and Guth also conclude that “popular American teachings on 
the EU have combined with traditional anti-Catholicism to undergird the anti-EU stance of conservative Christians 
in Protestant areas of Europe.”  Ibid., p. 258. 
13 Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, European Unification into the Twenty First Century:  Fading, Failing, Fragile?  
(Oisterwijk, NL:  Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012), 39.  The specific persons who are referenced in this passage are 
Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Alcide de Gasperi, and Konrad Adenauer.  Alan Fimister has affirmed this 
conclusion by writing that Robert Schuman “was resolved to apply to these (political and economic) problems 
(Jacques) Maritain’s philosophy of Christian Democracy.”  Fimister also concludes that “Konrad Adenauer was 
determined to integrate Germany within a western Christian bloc,” and that Schuman viewed Jean Monnet’s 
proposal for an European Coal and Steel Community “as a way of moving towards the supranational Christian 
Democratic society in which he belived.”  Robert Schuman:  Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of 
Europe (Brussels:  Peter Lang, 2008), 255-256. 
14 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (New York:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 9.  The acronym “ECSC” stands for the European Coal and Steel Community, while the abbreviation 
“EEC” represents the European Economic Community.  The Web address for the European People’s Party is 
http://epp.eu/ 
 recent decades,  the dominant narrative in the United States has been one of a sharp decline in  
 
Christian belief and practice throughout most of Europe, crossing denominational and  
 
ecclesiastical lines.15 
 
While American evangelical perspectives on the European Union may have their roots in  
 
history and theology, they have certainly been influenced by various modes of thought, as well  
 
as current trends, within political economy; the paradigm in which politics, economics, and  
 
ethical judgments interact with one another.  This combination constitutes an example of the  
 
second element of Boulding’s description of a worldview:  a moral system which produces  
 
subsequent actions.  One of the common political critiques of the European Union, particularly 
 
among “conservatives” on both sides of the Atlantic, is that the EU’s mission has evolved from  
 
the original intent of its founders – the promotion of post-war recovery and peace through  
 
economic integration – to the creation of a regional system of administrative control that will  
 
erode both democracy and national sovereignty.  Todd Huizenga, a former U.S. diplomat in  
 
Europe who is now affiliated with the Acton Institute of Grand Rapids, Michigan, has described  
 
the EU as a “soft utopia,” in contrast to the “hard utopias” of fascism and Communism.16  The  
 
Acton Institute, which includes both conservative evangelicals and Catholics in its base of  
 
support, expanded upon this theme in a three-part series, authored by Stephen Copp, entitled  
 
“God, Brexit, and EUtopia,” which was posted on its Religion and Liberty Transatlantic  
 
Webpage between December 5th and 18th, 2017.17  In the first of these essays, Copp asserted that  
 
                                                          
15 For an example of this perspective, see George Weigel, The Cube and the Cathedral:  Europe, America, and 
Politics Without God (New York:  Basic Books, 2005). 
16 Todd Huizenga, The New Totalitarian Temptation:  Global Governance and the Crisis of Democracy in Europe 
(New York:  Encounter Books, 2016), viii.  As an example of the potential linkage between political and theological 
judgments, Huizenga also describes contemporary Europe as “atheistic” and “post-Christian,” and asserts that the 
“soft utopia that is the EU might be considered the natural, almost inevitable face of Christendom gone apostate” (p. 
xvii).  
17 The Web address for this online publication is https://acton.org/publications/transatlantic/ 
while “the key protagonists of the early European project included some no doubt who shared an  
 
explicit moral/religious vision for its future,” the inner soul of contemporary Europe is “empty”  
 
and “ a vacuum which has yet to be filled – and history sets dangerous precedents for this.”18   
 
In the third column in this series, Copp argues that “the EU utopian vision, like all utopian  
 
visions, clashes with the ideal of self-determination.”19  All of these arguments help to form the 
 
basis for the judgment that the European Union represents an example of an attempt to  
 
engage in “global governance”:  a phrase that immediately raises concerns among both political  
 
and religious “conservatives,” because the institutional manifestations of this concept are seen as  
 
potential threats to their respective freedoms.  Robert Gorman, in a publication of the Acton  
 
Institute’s Christian Social Thought series, supports this conclusion by claiming that certain  
 
institutional representatives of the European Union, such as the president of the European  
 
Commission, are “identifiable advocates of global governance.”20  While Todd Huizenga  
 
concludes that while “the global governance ideology has not yet won the day in the EU,” he  
 
expresses the view that there is still a fundamental difference in outlook between the United  
 
States and the European Union with respect to the potential trade-offs between “democratic  
 
sovereignty and global governance.”21  This distinction could help to explain the enthusiasm of  
 
American conservatives – of all varieties - for the outcome of the “Brexit” referendum in the  
 
United Kingdom in June, 2016, in spite of the fact that the United States had no direct stake in  
 
the outcome of that vote.22 
                                                          
18 Stephen F. Copp, God, Brexit, and EUtopia (Part 1).  Religion and Liberty Transatlantic.  
https://acton.org/publications/transatlantic/2017/12/05/god-brexit-and-eutopia-part-1  Accessed 12 December 2017. 
19 Copp, A non-utopian Christian vision for Europe:  God, Brexit, and EUtopia (Part 3).  Religion and Liberty 
Transatlantic.  https://acton.org/publications/transatlantic/2017/12/18/non-utopian-christian-vision-europe-god-
brexit-and-eutopia  Accessed 19 December 2017. 
20 Robert F. Gorman, What’s Wrong with Global Governance? (Grand Rapids, MI:  Acton Institute for the Study of 
Religion and Liberty, 2016), 41. 
21 Huizenga, pp. 124-125.  John Fonte, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, is more definitive in his judgment on 
this issue.  Chapter Six of his book, Sovereignty or Submission:  Will Americans Rule Themselves or Be Ruled by 
Others? (New York:  Encounter Books, 2011)  is entitled, “The European Union:  A Model of Global Governance.” 
 This reaction to Great Britain’s decision, by majority vote, to leave the European Union,  
 
was preceded by warnings, from both sides of the Atlantic, that the United States should be wary  
 
of following Europe’s example:  not just in politics and culture, but in economics as well.  Daniel  
 
Hannan, a Member of the European Parliament from the United Kingdom who was a prominent  
 
supporter of the Leave campaign in the run-up to the “Brexit” referendum, is also the author of a  
 
previous book whose title is partially derived from Friedrich von Hayek’s 1944 volume, The  
 
Road to Serfdom.23 The fifth chapter is entitled, “Don’t Copy Europe,” and consists of a series of  
 
admonitions by Mr. Hannan to the effect that the United States would do well to resist an  
 
approach to public policy which would “Europeanize” (i.e., increase the size and scope  
 
of governmental responsibility, with correspondingly higher levels of public spending, taxation,  
 
and regulation) American life in areas such as health care, welfare, civil society, immigration,  
 
and federalism, as well as the economy as a whole.24  In a more recently published work, Samuel  
 
Gregg, who serves as Director of Research for the Acton Institute, sees “worrying parallels”  
 
between the United States and the European Union in the following areas:   
 
- The distribution of economic benefits on the basis of political criteria; 
 
- The establishment of public systems of social welfare that are financially  
 
 unsustainable; 
 
- “Creating a monetary system that has fallen prey to a dangerous cycle of debt and  
 
deficits”; 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 An exception to the standard “conservative” critique of the EU has been provided by Dalibor Rohac, of the 
American Enterprise Institute, in Towards An Imperfect Union:  A Conservative Case for the EU (Lanham, MD:  
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). 
23 Daniel Hannan, The New Road to Serfdom:  A Letter of Warning to America (New York:  HarperCollins, 2010). 
24 Ibid., pp.73-118.  Mr. Hannan was also  the opening speaker at the 2011 Free Market Forum in Atlanta, Georgia.  
The author attended this conference, which was primarily sponsored by Hillsdale College, in cooperation with the 
Acton Institute and the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, an organization of evangelical institutions 
located primarily in the United States. 
- An inconsistent response to the process of globalization, which is contributing to an  
 
increased level of political and economic tensions.25 
 
 These concerns resonate with conservative evangelicals in the United States, given the  
 
historic aversion to governmental actions that might be regarded as a movement in the direction 
 
of “socialism,” in spite of the imprecision often associated with the definition of that term.  
 
Looking back to the 1930’s, Darren Dochuk has maintained that a combination of “their end- 
 
times beliefs” with their conservative social outlook “caused them (evangelical Protestants) to  
 
rail against the isms (emphasis in the original) perceived to be at the center of the New Deal –  
 
socialism and internationalism.”26  In our present age, these dispositions can also help to explain  
 
the intensity of conservative opposition, including among evangelicals, to the centerpiece of the  
 
Affordable Care Act – the individual insurance mandate – even though that legislation built upon  
 
the existing private health insurance system, and  did not constitute a national (“single-payer”)  
 
approach. 
 
 What is the connective tissue that holds all of the various dimensions – historical,  
 
theological, political, and economic – of American evangelical antipathy towards the European  
 
Union together?  Writing in 1950, the English Catholic theologian Ronald Knox characterized  
 
the evangelical emphasis on an experiential faith as one in which “you needed neither a theology 
 
nor a liturgy; you did not take the strain of intellectual inquiry, nor associate yourself whole- 
 
heartedly with any historic tradition of worship.”27  Knox also concluded  that “at the heart of  
 
him, the Evangelical is always an experimentalist,”28 and that the United States is “the last  
 
refuge” for this type of religious enthusiasm.29  For a number of reasons, American evangelicals 
                                                          
25 Samuel Gregg, Becoming Europe:  Economic Decline, Culture, and How America Can Avoid a European Future  
(New York:  Encounter Books, 2013), 120. 
26 Dochuk, p. 121. 
27 R. A. Knox, Enthusiasm:  A Chapter in the History of Religion (Oxford, UK:  Clarendon Press, 1950), 589. 
28 Ibid., p. 588. 
 appear, for the most part, to have made a major contribution towards the current political and   
 
social “experiment” with populist nationalism in the United States.  One of the “enthusiasms” 
 
which propels this latter movement, in both the North American and European continents, is 
 
a critical perspective towards institutions, of all types, which are thought to represent “the  
 
establishment,” and the European Union serves a prime example for those who hold these  
 
views.30  Martin Wolf, the associate editor and chief economics commentator for the Financial  
 
Times, has described the populist phenomenon in the following manner: 
 
 The abiding characteristic of populism is its division of the world into a virtuous people 
on the one hand, and corrupt elites and threatening outsiders on the other.  Populists distrust 
institutions, especially those that constrain the ‘will of the people,’ such as courts, independent 
media, the bureaucracy and fiscal or monetary rules.  Populists reject credentialed experts.  They 
are also suspicious of free markets and free trade.31 
 
 The argument can certainly be made that all of the factors which have contributed to a  
 
negative outlook on the European Union, on the part of American evangelicals, have also helped  
 
to facilitate a certain degree of acceptance of the populist narrative that Wolf has described.  
 
American evangelicals already regard themselves as a “virtuous people,” even in comparison to 
 
members of other Christian traditions, and the theological and political perspectives which have  
 
been previously discussed help to foster an inherent suspicion of “elites” and “outsiders.”  The  
 
evangelical emphasis on “experience,” which was referenced by Ronald Knox, may very well  
 
provide support for the lack of trust in “institutions” and “credentialed experts” which is  
 
mentioned by Wolf, especially if those institutions and persons are not rooted in a relatively local 
 
community.  Although American evangelicals tend to think of themselves as “pro-market”  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29 Ibid., p. 3. 
30 In a public lecture last April, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former Prime Minister of Norway and Director-General 
of the World Health Organization, stated that “Americans who maintain that ‘Washington is the problem,’ and 
Europeans who assert that ‘Brussels is the problem,’ are essentially making the same argument.”  Author’s notes 
from the 32nd Adlai E. Stevenson II Memorial Lecture, held at Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Illinois, 
April 13, 2017. 
31 Martin Wolf, “The economic origins of the populist surge.”  Financial Times, June 27, 2017, p. 9. 
 (especially if it is regarded as the opposite of being “pro-government”) their openness to  
 
nationalist economic arguments suggests that those “enthusiasms” may very well stop at the  
 
water’s edge.32  These sentiments may have also been fueled by a delayed reaction to the events  
 
surrounding the financial crisis and global recession of 2007 – 2009.  Martin Wolf has stated that 
 
these events “not only had huge costs,” but that “they also damaged confidence in – and so the  
 
legitimacy of – financial and policy-making elites.33 
 
 While American evangelical pre-dispositions towards the European Union, as an  
 
institution, may have their intellectual roots in particular theological perspectives and certain  
 
readings of history, the contemporary vigor with which these views are held has been fueled by 
 
widely shared outlooks in politics and economics, including, but not limited to, the current trends  
 
towards populist and nationalist policies.  The employment of words and phrases such as  
 
“sovereignty” and “global governance” by critics of transnational institutions, including the  
 
European Union, resonate with considerable portions of the American evangelical community in  
 
ways that reinforce and accelerate the intensity with which a critical position is held, in part  
 
because it makes these issues seem more relevant to citizens of the United States.  The passage  
 
of time will tell how the winds of change that were ushered in by the beginning of the “Age of  
 
Anxiety,” which Gideon Rachman, the chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial  
 
Times, dates from 2008 to the present, will influence the application of these beliefs.34 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 This figure of speech was used by U.S. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, in the 1940’s, to refer to a bi-partisan 
approach to American foreign policy in the aftermath of World War II.  See Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The 
Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 112. 
33 Wolf, op. cit.  A defense of the role of institutions during these years has been provided by Daniel Drezner in The 
System Worked:  How the World Stopped another Great Depression (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2014). 
34 Gideon Rachman, Zero-Sum Future:  American Power in an Age of Anxiety (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 
2012), 11. 
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